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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal of the district court's decision to affirm the Elmore County (hereinafter 
the "County") Board of County Commissioners' (hereinafter the "Board") denial of two 
applications filed pursuant to Idaho's medical indigency statutes, Idaho Code (hereinafter "LC.") 
§§ 31-3501-3558 (hereinafter the "Act"). Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (hereinafter 
"Saint Alphonsus"), the Appellant herein, filed third party medical indigency applications on 
behalf of patients T.A. and T.O. The Board denied both applications, determining neither 
application was a "completed application" as defined by LC. § 31-3502(7).1 Saint Alphonsus 
timely filed petitions for judicial review with the district court, and these cases were consolidated 
for appeal.2 The district court affirmed the Board's denials of the applications. Saint Alphonsus 
timely appealed the district court's determination. 
B. Statement of Facts and Procedural History 
The County does not dispute Appellant's recitation of facts and procedural history 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 1-3). 
The County offers the following facts to supplement the Appellant's statement of facts and 
procedural history. As noted by the Appellant, the Board concluded the applications were 
1 LC.§ 31-3502(7), as it was amended in 2011 and before the additional 2013 amendments, stated that a "'completed 
application' shall include at a minimum the cover sheet requesting services, applicant information including diagnosis 
and requests for services and signatures, personal information of the applicant, patient rights and responsibilities, 
releases and all other signatures required in the application." 
2 Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Petitioner v. Elmore County and the Board of Elmore County 
Commissioners, Respondents In Re: TA., Case No. CV-2013-720 and Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 
Petitioner v. Elmore County and the Board of Elmore County Commissioners, Respondents In Re: TO., Case No. 
CV-2013-722. 
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incomplete for two primary reasons: ( 1) a lack of required signatures by the patient or third party 
applicant on pages 1, 9, and 10; and (2) incomplete information regarding the applicant's 
residency, contact information, and financial situation. (See Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits, 
Clerk's Record for K-03-13-07 filed on September 10, 2013 (hereinafter "T.O.R.") at 172, 113 and 
Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits, Clerk's Record for K-03-13-08 filed on September 10, 2013 
(hereinafter "T.A.R.") at 118, 112). The Board's determinations for each application were 
virtually identical. (T.O.R., 167-176; T.A.R., 113-121). 
The district court's review of the Board's decision was limited to whether the Board erred 
in its conclusion that the applications on behalf ofT.O. and T.A. were not completed applications 
under the Act. (Clerk's Record on Appeal for S.C. # 42175 (hereinafter "R.") at 054). The district 
court determined LC.§ 31-3502(7) was clear and unambiguous. (R. at 058). In applying the plain 
meaning of the statute, the court held the Board did not err in finding that the applications were 
not complete. (R. at 062). The district court held the applications contained sufficient personal 
and financial information, and only the lack of required signatures and initials rendered the 
applications incomplete under I. C. § 31-3 502(7). The issue on appeal to this Court is whether the 
Board erred in concluding signatures on the Application (page 1), Patient's Rights and 
Responsibilities (page 9), and Release (page 10) pages, as well as more detailed personal 
information about the patient, are prerequisites to a complete medical indigency application. 
As amended and supplemented herein, the County adopts the Appellant's recitation of 
factual and procedural history for the purposes of this brief, as set forth in the Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 1-3. 
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II. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the Appellant failed to meet its burden before the Board to establish that it 
presented completed applications pursuant to LC. § 31-3502(7), and whether Appellant failed to 
meet its burden on appeal to the district court to establish that the Board's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law were not supported by competent evidence. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews an agency's decision and record independently of the district court's 
appellate decision, as if the case were directly appealed to this Court. This Court will give serious 
consideration to the district court's decision. Mercy Medical Center v. Ada County and the Board 
of County Commissioners of Ada County, 146 Idaho 226,229, 192 P.3d 1050, 1053 (2008); In re 
Ackerman, 127 Idaho 495,497, 903 P.2d 84, 86 (1995) (citing Dovel v. Dobson, 122 Idaho 59, 61, 
831 P.2d 527, 599 (1992)); Univ. of Utah Hosp. v. Bd. of Comm 'rs of Payette County, 128 Idaho 
517,519,915 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Ct. App. 1996). Thus, the Court will directly consider the Board's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. If the Board's findings of fact were supported by 
substantial and competent evidence and the Board's conclusions of law followed from those 
findings, and if the district court affirmed the Board's decision, this Court affirms the district 
court's decision "as a matter of procedure." St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 
Ltd. v. Board of County Commissioners of Gooding County, 149 Idaho 584, 587, 237 P.3d 1210, 
1213 (2010). 
A denial of an application for financial assistance is reviewed under the Idaho 
Administrative Procedures Act ("IAPA"). See LC. §§ 31-35050 and 31-1506; In re Ackerman, 
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127 Idaho at 496, 903 P.2d at 85 (1995); Mercy Medical Center, 146 Idaho at 229, 192 P.3d at 
1053. In reviewing the Board's decision, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the 
Board on questions of fact, and will uphold the Board's findings if supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. See LC. § 67-5279(1); Shobe v. Ada County Bd. of County Comm 'rs, 130 
Idaho 580,583,944 P.2d 715, 718 (1997). 
The party challenging the Board's decision has the burden to demonstrate the Board's 
error. A reviewing court shall affirm the agency's action unless it finds the agency's decision (1) 
violates constitutional or statutory provisions, (2) exceeds the agency's statutory authority, (3) is 
made upon unlawful procedure, (4) is not supported by substantial evidence in the record, or (5) 
is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC. § 67-5279(3); Price v. Payette County Bd. 
of County Comm 'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P .2d 583 (1998). To prevail, the challenging party 
must first illustrate that the Board erred in one of the ways specified in LC. § 67-5279(3), and that 
the Board's error prejudiced a substantial right of the appellant. LC. § 67-5279(4); Price, 131 
Idaho at 429, 958 P.2d at 586; Univ. of Utah Hosp. v. Ada County Bd. of Comm 'rs, 143 Idaho at 
812, 153 P.3d at 1158. To determine whether an agency's findings are supported by substantial 
evidence, the Court must review the whole record before the agency at the time of its decision, 
including evidence contrary to the Board's decision. Local 1494 of Int'! Ass 'n of Firefighters v. 
City of Coeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630,634, 586 P.2d 1346, 1349 (1978); Shobe, 130 Idaho at 583, 
944 P.2d at 718. 
This Court also exercises free review over the interpretation of a statute and its application 
to the facts of a case. St. Luke's Regional Med. Cent 'r, Ltd. v. Board of Commissioners of Ada 
9 
County, 146 Idaho 753,755,203 P.3d 683,685 (2009). The challenged statute must be viewed as 
a whole, and a reviewing court must first analyze the statute's language. Id. If a statute is clear 
and unambiguous, the court should not engage in statutory construction, but instead simply give 
effect to the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of the statute. BHC Intermountain Hospital, Inc. 
v. Ada County, 150 Idaho 93, 95-96, 244 P.3d 237, 239 (2010). When interpreting the literal 
language of the statute, the court should apply all of a statute's provisions, so that the statute 
maintains its potency and no part is rendered void, superfluous, insignificant, or redundant. Id.; 
Brown v. Caldwell School District No. 132, 127 Idaho 112, 117, 898 P .2d 43, 48 (1995); Hillside 
Landscape Construction, Inc. v. City of Lewiston, 151 Idaho 749,753,264 P.3d 388,392 (2011). 
A court should only look beyond the plain meaning of the statute's language and consider 
rules of statutory construction if the statute is ambiguous-that is, if the statute is capable of more 
than one reasonable construction, the plain meaning of the language is contrary to clearly 
expressed legislative intent, or an application of the ordinary meaning would lead to absurd results. 
St. Luke's, 146 Idaho at 755,203 P.3d at 685 (citation omitted); Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. 
Dist. No. 84, 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 (2006). When a court engages in statutory 
construction, it must give effect to the legislative intent, which "should be derived from a reading 
of the whole act at issue." St. Luke's, 146 Idaho at 755,203 P.3d at 685. Ifa court determines a 
challenged statute is ambiguous, it may then consider the reasonableness of proposed 
interpretations, the policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. Id. 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
Saint Alphonsus, as a third party applicant, submitted two medical indigency applications 
to the Board. The Board determined the applications were not "completed applications" pursuant 
to LC. § 31-3502(7) based on a lack of required signatures and incomplete patient personal 
information. The district court affirmed the Board's ultimate decision to deny the applications for 
incompleteness, but only on the basis of omitted signatures. The district court found Saint 
Alphonsus provided sufficient information about the patient for the County to proceed with its 
investigation. In making this decision, the Board and district court properly applied the plain 
meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute in a manner congruent with the legislative intent of 
the Act. Pursuant to the literal language of § 31-3502(7), Saint Alphonsus failed to present 
completed applications to the County. The Board's factual findings were supported by substantial 
and competent evidence, and its conclusions of law followed from those factual findings. Thus, 
the district court properly affirmed the Board's decision and this Court should affirm the district 
court as a matter of procedure. 
A. The statute at issue here is clear and unambiguous, and the Board and district 
court's application of the plain meaning of the statute comports with legislative 
intent. Thus, this Court should not engage in statutory construction, but should 
simply apply the statute's plain meaning. 
Saint Alphonsus begins its argument by claiming the Board and district court failed to 
recognize "several decades' worth of Idaho precedent," and failed to consider "the history of the 
Medical Indigency Act, changes to it and its legislative purpose." (Appellant's Brief, p. 6). 
However, Saint Alphonsus does not argue until the end of its brief that LC. § 31-3502(7) "might 
11 
be construed as ambiguous." (Appellant's Brief, pp. 21-23). Saint Alphonsus urges this Court to 
engage in statutory construction to find the Board's decision was "contrary to long-standing and 
clearly expressed legislative intent and purpose," and deem the applications "complete." 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 23). 
Saint Alphonsus' argument fails, as this Court must not engage in statutory construction, 
such as a review of legislative history or precedent, when a statute is unambiguous. This Court 
must first consider the literal language of the challenged statute and give effect to the plain, usual, 
and ordinary meaning of the words. Verska, MD. v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 
151 Idaho 889, 893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011). If the statute is unambiguous, this Court has no 
occasion to construe the statute, but must follow the law as written. Id.; BHC Intermountain 
Hospital, 150 Idaho at 95-96, 244 P .3d at 239. Extrinsic evidence, such as legislative history, 
should not be consulted by the Court. Verska, 151 Idaho at 893, 265 P.3d at 506. This Court does 
not have authority to rewrite, revise, or void an unambiguous statute simply because an application 
of the statute's plain meaning may produce undesirable results for the challenging party. Id. at 
895, 265 P.3d at 508. The Court should consider the language of a statute and act as a whole to 
determine and properly apply the plain meaning of the statute's language. BHC Intermountain 
Hospital, 150 Idaho at 95-96, 244 P.3d at 239; St. Luke's, 146 Idaho at 755,203 P.3d at 685. 
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1. The literal language of LC. § 31-3502{7), when considered with other 
definitions provided in the Act, is clear and unambiguous. 
Here, the definition of "completed application"3 provided in LC. § 31-3502(7) is clear and 
unambiguous. This provision requires the applicant or third party applicant to provide certain 
minimal information, including a cover sheet requesting services, applicant information regarding 
the patient's diagnoses and necessary services, personal information of the applicant,4 patient 
rights and responsibilities, releases, and all other signatures required in the application. LC. § 31-
3502(7). The Board determined the two applications at issue here were incomplete. (T.O.R. at 
172, iI 13; T.A.R. at 118, iI 12). Saint Alphonsus argues that this statute is ambiguous as it does 
not specifically define the terms "personal information of the applicant," "patient rights and 
responsibilities," "releases," or "all other signatures required in this application." These terms, 
and the definition of "completed application" as a whole, are clear when the ordinary meaning of 
the words is considered and read in conjunction with other provisions of the medical indigency 
statutes. 
While a primary purpose of the medical indigency statutes is to provide compensation to 
providers who care for medically indigent individuals, it is also clear that a county is not obligated 
to supply that compensation absent a finding that the patient is medically indigent, that the medical 
services received were necessary, and that the patient is a resident of the county from which a 
3 Defined supra at page 6. 
4 LC.§ 31-3502(7) was further amended in 2013 to require "personal and financial information of the applicant and 
obligated person or persons ... ". This amendment was not in effect at the time the applications were submitted or the 
decisions were rendered by the Board. The County submits the language of this statute was clear and unambiguous 
prior to and after this amendment. 
13 
provider is seeking repayment. LC.§ 31-3503(1); In re Ackerman, 127 Idaho at 497-98, 903 P.2d 
at 86-87. It follows that the purpose of the application for financial assistance and subsequent 
investigation by the county clerk is to determine medical indigency, medical necessity, and 
residency. LC. § 31-3503(1 ). During the application process and investigation, an applicant or 
third party applicant has a duty to cooperate with the clerk and assist him in "ascertaining 
eligibility" for the county's medically indigent program. LC. § 3 l-3505A(2). 
Given this policy and framework, "personal information of the applicant" plainly refers to 
data that would assist the clerk with her determination of the patient's eligibility for the program, 
namely information about his residence, financial resources, and the necessity of the medical 
services. "Emergency service," "medically indigent," "necessary medical services," "resident," 
and "resources" are clearly defined by the statute. LC.§ 31-3502(12), (17), (18), (24) and (25). 
These definitions provide guidance as to the facts an applicant or third party applicant must include 
in an application to demonstrate that eligible services were provided to an eligible individual. For 
instance, the definitions of "medically indigent" and "resources," read together, would require an 
applicant to show he does not have available assets-including interests in property, public 
assistance, or insurance, among many other specifically enumerated "resources"-to pay for 
necessary medical services. LC. § 31-3502(17) and (25). Likewise, to prove the patient is a 
"resident" for the purpose of eligibility for the medical indigency program, the applicant would 
need to demonstrate he had "actually lived" in the state and county for a certain period of time. 
LC.§§ 31-3502(24) and 31-3506. 
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The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter "IDHW") obviously recognized 
the plain meaning of "personal information" when developing the combined application form. The 
combined application form prompts the applicant to provide specific personal information about 
the applicant: the patient's diagnosis and services needed,5 residency information,6 any public 
assistance received or insurance carried by or for the patient, 7 and statements regarding the 
patient's income and resources.8 Personal information would also clearly include contact 
information, such as a telephone number or email address, to enable the county clerk to investigate 
the application more expeditiously.9 Saint Alphonsus correctly notes "personal information of the 
applicant" is undefined in the statute. However, a literal reading of this term and consideration of 
the statute as a whole provide ample notice to a third party applicant regarding the information 
needed to satisfy the "personal information" requirement. 
Saint Alphonsus also asserts the term "all other signatures required in the application" is 
ambiguous. Again, this Court must begin with a literal reading of the statute's language and 
consider the Act as a whole. BHC lntermountain Hospital, 150 Idaho at 95-96, 244 P.3d at 239. 
The plain language of I.C. § 31-3502(7) clearly indicates some signatures are required for an 
application to be "complete." Other provisions of the Act further elucidate the signature 
requirement. The Act requires that an applicant or third party applicant swear to the truth of the 
matters contained in the application, and that the application "be signed by the applicant or third 
5 T.O.R. at 003-004; T.A.R. at 003. 
6 T.O.R. at 005-006; T.A.R. at 004-005. 
7 T.O.R at 007; T.A.R. at 006. 
8 T.O.R. at 009-011; T.A.R. at 008-010. 
9 T.O.R. at 005; T.A.R. at 004. 
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party applicant." LC. § 31-3504(1). Additionally, the Act provides that "[i]f a third party 
completed application is filed, the application shall be presented in the same form and manner as 
set forth in subsection (1) of this section." LC.§ 31-3504(2). Obviously, the legislature intended 
a completed third party application to meet the same requirements as that filed by an individual 
applicant, and include signatures by the third party applicant and a sworn statement acknowledging 
the truth of the matters in the application. 
The terms "releases" and "patient rights and responsibilities" are likewise clear and 
unambiguous, and those requirements have been appropriately adopted by the IDHW in its 
combined application form. (T.O.R. at 12-13; T.A.R. 11-12). The Act provides the application 
for financial assistance is deemed consent for healthcare providers, the hospital, IDHW, and 
counties to exchange information about the patient. LC. § 31-3504(1 ). Requiring an applicant or 
third party applicant to provide fully executed patient rights advisory forms and releases ensures 
the patient understands his privacy rights, and allows the county to more quickly and effectively 
conduct its investigation. 
Saint Alphonsus correctly notes the language of LC. § 31-3502(7) does not specify where 
an applicant or third party applicant must sign the application or what personal information is 
required. However, the terms employed by the legislature in the definition of "completed 
application," when considered in the context of other provisions, are clear and unambiguous, as is 
the definition as a whole. The literal language of LC. § 31-3502(7) plainly creates minimum 
requirements for an application to be deemed "complete." This Court should employ the plain 
16 
meaning of this statute when determining whether Saint Alphonsus presented completed 
applications to the Board here. 
The consequence for an applicant or third party applicant's failure to present a completed 
application within the applicable time limitations is also unambiguous. The Act provides "[n]o 
application for financial assistance under the county medically indigent program or the 
catastrophic health care cost program shall be approved by the county commissioners ... unless the 
provider or the hospital completed the application process and complies with the time limits 
prescribed by this section." LC.§ 31-3505(6). Additionally, "[a]ny application or request which 
fails to meet the provisions of this section and other provisions of this chapter, shall be denied." 
I.C. § 31-3505(7). The denial of incomplete applications is not discretionary with the Board. If 
the Board does not receive a completed application "in the form prescribed by this chapter. . .in 
accordance with the provisions of this chapter," it does not have jurisdiction to hear or approve the 
application. LC.§ 31-3511(2). The duty of Saint Alphonsus to submit a completed application, 
and the result for its failure to do so, are clear and unambiguous. 
2. The plain meaning of"completed application" comports with the Act's general 
legislative intent. 
Saint Alphonsus further argues the "completed application" provision of the Act is 
ambiguous because the Board and district court's interpretation of the plain language of the statute 
is contrary to legislative intent. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 6-10, 17-23). The County submits that an 
application of this statute's plain language comports with legislative intent, both in its enactment 
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of the specific "completed application" requirement and in the medical indigency statutes as a 
whole. 
Saint Alphonsus correctly states the legislature's primary policy behind enacting the 
medical indigency statutes: to provide suitable medical care and facilities for medically indigent 
residents, and to compensate providers for those services. LC.§ 31-3501(1). The Idaho Supreme 
Court has routinely applied the plain meaning of this statutory provision when determining that 
the legislature clearly intended to allow hospitals to obtain compensation for services rendered to 
a county's indigent residents. University of Utah Hospital, 143 Idaho at 810, 153 P.3d at 1156. In 
order to give effect to this intent, this Court has recognized a provider's right to file a medical 
indigency application absent patient cooperation, 10 clarified the duty of a county to investigate an 
application, 11 and affirmed the right of a third party applicant to seek judicial review of an adverse 
agency decision. 12 Saint Alphonsus ignores the second part of the legislature's declaration of 
policy, however, which is expressed in LC.§ 31-3501(2): 
(2) The county medically indigent program and the catastrophic health care cost 
program are payers of last resort. Therefore, applicants or third party applicants 
seeking financial assistance under the county medically indigent program and the 
catastrophic health care cost program shall be subject to the limitations and 
requirements as set forth herein. 
LC. § 31-3501(2) (emphasis added). Clearly, the legislature intended to impose at least some 
duties and requirements on applicants and third party applicants seeking compensation under the 
county medically indigent program. For instance, I.C. § 31-3505 designates time limitations in 
,o Id. 
II Id. 
12 St. Luke's, 146 Idaho at 759,203 P.3d at 689. 
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which applications must be presented, LC. § 31-3505A obligates the applicant or third party 
applicant to cooperate with the county's investigation of the application, and LC. § 31-3504 
requires a third party applicant to present an application in the same form and manner as an 
individual application. 
Presenting a "completed application" for review by the county clerk and board is an 
additional duty placed on third party applicants. The legislature did not impose this duty 
accidentally. References to a completed application occur throughout the medical indigency 
statutes. In discussing the time limitations in which an application must be presented to the county, 
the legislature repeatedly indicated that a "completed application .. . shall be filed" within the 
specified time. LC. § 31-3505(1)(2) and (3) (emphasis added). The statute further noted "[n]o 
application for financial assistance ... shall be approved by the county commissioners or the board 
unless the provider or the hospital completes the application." LC. § 31-3505( 6) ( emphasis added). 
The Act provides for the mandatory denial of any application that fails to meet the provisions of 
the chapter-a seemingly harsh result from the provider's perspective. LC. § 31-3505(7). This 
provision favors the County's interpretation of the statute's plain language. 
Saint Alphonsus' argument that the Board and district court's interpretation of"completed 
application" is contrary to legislative intent relies primarily on the precedent established by the 
line of cases recognizing a third party applicant's right to file and pursue applications absent patient 
cooperation. (Appellant's Brief, p. 7) (citations omitted). Saint Alphonsus asserts the County's 
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position here is identical to that of Ada County in St. Luke 's. 13 In St. Luke's, Ada County argued 
that a 1996 amendment to the Medical Indigency Act overturned the rulings of Carpenter v. Twin 
Falls County, 107 Idaho 575,691 P.3d 1190 (1984), andintermountainHealth Care, Inc. v. Board 
of County Commissioners of Blaine County, 109 Idaho 299, 707 P.2d 410 (1985). St. Luke's, 146 
Idaho at 758-59, 203 P.3d at 687-88. In both Carpenter andintermountain Health Care, the Court 
had recognized the right of third party applicants to seek judicial review of adverse agency 
decisions under the Act, as the providers had a pecuniary interest in the disposition of the 
applications. Carpenter, 107 Idaho at 585, 691 P.3d at 1200; Intermountain, 109 Idaho at 302, 
707 P.2d at 413. The 1996 amendments to the Act added definitions for the terms "applicant," 
"third party applicant," and "provider," and indicated that a "third party making an application on 
the applicant's behalf' had the right to petition for judicial review. St. Luke's, 146 Idaho at 757, 
203 P.3d at 687. Ada County then argued that by explicitly granting standing to seek judicial 
review to "third parties making an application on the applicant's behalf," the legislature intended 
to subtract providers from the group of parties entitled to seek review. Id. at 758,203 P.3d at 688. 
This Court found Ada County's arguments unpersuasive, noting that "[ t ]he legislature is presumed 
not to intend to overturn long established principles of law unless an intention to do so plainly 
appears by express declaration or the language employed admits of no other construction." Id. 
St. Luke's is readily distinguishable from the facts at issue here. Ada County's argument 
in St. Luke's was clearly contrary to the legislative intent of the medical indigency statutes, and 
13 146 Idaho 753, 203 P.3d 683. 
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even the plain meaning of the statute. In Carpenter, the Court held that as a real party in interest, 
the hospital was "entitled to make an application for medical indigency benefits on behalf of the 
person to whom emergency medical services were provided, entitled to pursue the denial of such 
benefits by appeal, and entitled to the receipt of the County's payment." 107 Idaho at 586, 691 
P.2d at 1201. The legislature is presumed to have full knowledge of existing judicial interpretation 
when it amends a statute. St. Luke's, 146 Idaho at 758,203 P.3d at 688. Therefore, the Court must 
assume the legislature knew of a provider's status as one "entitled to make an application for 
medical indigency benefits on behalf of [the patient]" when it provided by statute that a "third 
party making an application on the applicant's behalf' had the right to petition for judicial review. 
The county's interpretation of the 1996 amendments in St. Luke's was contrary to existing 
precedent, clearly expressed legislative intent, and the plain meaning of the statute. The Court 
noted that there was "no express declaration or language that offers an unequivocal construction 
that the legislature intended to overturn the long established principle that providers have standing 
to seek review of adverse board decisions." Id. There, an alternate, and much more reasonable, 
construction was easily ascertainable by the Court: the legislature, aware of the existing precedent, 
intended to expand that precedent to allow a more inclusive group of third party applicants to file 
medical indigency applications-both providers, who already had standing, and individuals 
without a pecuniary interest, who did not have standing under the then-existing statutory scheme 
and judicial precedent. Id. 
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Here, the legislature's definition of "completed application" does not overturn precedent, 
is congruent with the legislative intent of the Act, and the language employed admits of no other 
construction. As such, the Court must apply the plain meaning of the statute. 
Idaho courts presume that legislatures know of existing precedent when they pass or amend 
a statute. Seward v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, 138 Idaho 509, 512, 65 P.3d 531, 534 (2003) 
( citations omitted). Courts must also assume that when a statute is amended, the legislature 
intended "the statute to have a meaning different from the meaning accorded the statute before 
amendment." Id. (quoting Miller v. State, 110 Idaho 298,299, 715 P.2d 968, 969 (1986)). This 
Court may not presume that the legislature performed an idle act by enacting a meaningless 
provision, and must instead give effect to all its provisions so that no part will be rendered 
superfluous or insignificant. Brown, 127 Idaho at 117, 898 P.2d at 48. By incorporating a 
"completed application" requirement into the medical indigency statutes, the legislature did not 
intend to overturn existing precedent or subtract rights from providers. Neither the intent nor result 
of the 2011 amendments requiring a "completed application" is to void a provider's right to file 
third party applications,14 relieve counties of their duties to investigate an application,15 or curtail 
a third party applicant's right to seek judicial review. 16 Instead, the legislature decided to place a 
minimal burden upon providers to present a complete application to the county. 
t4 St. Luke's, 146 Idaho 753,203 P.3d 683. 
ts University of Utah Hospital, 143 Idaho 808, 153 P.3d 1154. Notably, when the Court considered the investigatory 
duties of the county and whether those duties had been performed, it first indicated "[t]he medical indigency statues 
place certain duties on a third party applicant, which the provider performed in this case." Id. at 811 (emphasis 
added). 
16 Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center v. Ada County, 146 Idaho 862, 204 P.3d 502 (2009). 
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Saint Alphonsus particularly argues the language of LC. § 31-3502(7) is ambiguous when 
considered in conjunction with LC. § 31-3502(26) and LC. § 3 l-3505A. The former allows third 
party applications, while the latter imposes an investigatory duty upon county clerks and indicates 
third party applicants need not have complete knowledge of all matters necessary to establish a 
patient's eligibility. LC.§§ 31-3502(26) and 3 l-3505A(l) and (2). This assertion is unpersuasive. 
The amended requirement for a "completed application" does not affect a third party applicant's 
right to file a medical indigency application. It likewise does not void a county's duty to 
investigate the application. Upon receipt of an application for financial assistance, the county clerk 
still has an obligation to inform the applicant of any material omissions that may result in denial, 17 
and to investigate an application pursuant to LC. § 3 l-3505A. However, the amended language 
of LC.§ 31-3502(7) does indicate when the county's duties to fully investigate the application are 
triggered: after the filing of a completed application. The County's application of the literal 
language of LC. § 31-3502(7) comports with the overall statutory scheme contained in the medical 
indigency statutes. References to a completed application appear throughout the Act, and the Act 
provides the harsh result of mandatory denial of the application for failure to meet the provisions 
of the chapter. LC.§§ 31-3505(1)(2) and (3); 31-3505(6); and 31-3505(7). The additional minimal 
burden placed upon providers to submit a completed application is congruent with the legislature's 
policy that the medically indigent program is a payer oflast resort and that providers be subject to 
17 The Board here made a finding of fact that the County complied with this duty. Though the clerk did not have 
specific record of advising Saint Alphonsus in these cases, she testified that the clerk routinely advises providers when 
the application received is incomplete (T.O.R. at 170, ,14; T.A.R. at 116, 'If 4). Saint Alphonsus did not dispute this 
finding before the Board or on appeal. 
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"limitations and requirements" appearing in the Act. LC. § 31-3501. The literal language of LC. 
§ 31-3502(7) provides an additional requirement consistent with this purpose. 
Finally, unlike in St. Luke's, the language employed by the legislature here admits of no 
other construction. The 2011 amendments to the Act clearly defined the minimal requirements of 
a "completed application." This term was then employed throughout the Act. The Court cannot 
view the inclusion of the "completed application" requirement as a haphazard, meaningless act by 
the legislature. The legislature's amendment here, as distinguished from that in St. Luke's, was 
clearly not taking away existing rights or codifying already existing precedent. St. Luke's, 146 
Idaho at 758, 203 P.3d at 688. Here, the legislature clearly intended to impose additional duties 
on a third party applicant. Saint Alphonsus argues that this Court has consistently expressed a 
concern that placing too heavy a burden on the provider could have a chilling effect on the services 
provided to indigent residents. St. Luke's, 146 Idaho at 759, 203 P.3d at 689. Therefore, the 
legislature could not have intended to place an additional burden on providers here, and, even if it 
did so intend, this intent is contrary to existing precedent and the intent of the Act in general. In 
so arguing, Saint Alphonsus fails to recognize that "[t]he wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency 
of a statute are questions for the legislature alone." Verska, 151 Idaho at 895, 265 P.3d at 508. 
This Court does not have the occasion to rewrite or void an unambiguous statute because it would 
produce harsh results as written. Id. The legislature clearly did intend to impose a minimal burden 
on the provider here, consistent with other limitations and requirements placed upon third party 
applicants. While the legislature's overarching purpose in implementing an unambiguous 
statutory provision is not the province of this Court, the purpose here is readily explainable. The 
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legislature desired to implement a statutory scheme that would continue to require counties to 
accept and fully investigate third party applications, but only when the provider complied with a 
statutory requirement of a completed application. The addition of this requirement provides for 
greater patient privacy and a more effective use of county resources. 
B. In applying the plain meaning of I.C. § 31-3502(7) this Court should fmd that the 
applications presented by Saint Alphonsus were not "completed applications" 
because the applications lacked the required signatures and did not contain 
sufficient personal information of the applicant. 
Saint Alphonsus bears the burden of establishing before this Court that it presented 
completed applications for indigent medical assistance to the County. Wheeler v. Idaho 
Department of Health & Welfare, 147 Idaho 257,260,207 P.3d 988,991 (2009). Saint Alphonsus 
failed to meet that burden before the Board, and fails to do so here. The applications did not 
include the necessary signatures or sufficient patient information, and were therefore not 
"completed applications." 
1. The applications submitted to the County by Saint Alphonsus lacked the 
required signatures, specifically on pages 1, 9, and 10 of the applications. 
The Board found that neither application submitted by Saint Alphonsus contained the 
signature of the applicant or third party applicant on pages 1 (the application) or 10 (the Release 
of Infonnation). The patient rights and responsibilities section of the application (page 9) was 
signed by a Saint Alphonsus representative as the third party applicant, but the enumerated rights 
and responsibilities were not initialed as indicated on the form. (T.O.R., pp. 169-170; T.A.R., pp. 
115-116). 
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Saint Alphonsus concedes that the applications were not signed on pages 1 and 10, and that 
the rights and responsibilities were not initialed on page 9. Saint Alphonsus submits it relied on 
the application form as designed by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, and completed 
all areas of the application that it was possible or necessary for the provider to complete. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 10-17). Saint Alphonsus correctly notes that the statutory scheme of the 
Act mandates that the application form for county assistance be developed by IDHW. LC. § 3 l-
3503C( 4). However, as will be discussed more fully below, Saint Alphonsus did not properly 
execute the patient's rights and responsibilities form or releases as required by statute, and 
appropriately recognized and provided for by IDHW's form. The Act unequivocally requires the 
execution of certain documents and the inclusion of particular signatures that were not provided 
here. Saint Alphonsus cannot simply argue that it attempted to follow the IDHW's standardized 
application form, when the information it provided clearly did not meet the requirements of the 
Act. Saint Alphonsus failed to submit "completed applications" as contemplated by statute. 
Saint Alphonsus admits the first page of the application was not signed, but argues this 
page did not provide a space for the signature of a third party applicant. (Appellant's Brief, p. 14). 
It is true that the first page of the application form only provides a signature line for an "applicant" 
or "co-applicant." (T.O.R. at 3; T.A.R. at 3). Saint Alphonsus also correctly points out that the 
definition of "applicant" in the medical indigency statutes is distinct from that of "third party 
applicant."18 There is no dispute herein that Saint Alphonsus is a third party applicant. The Act 
18 LC. § 31-3502(1) defines "applicant" as "any person who is requesting financial assistance under this chapter." I.C. 
§ 31-3502(26) defines "third party applicant" as "a person other than the obligated person who completes, signs and 
files an application on behalf of a patient. A third party applicant who files an application on behalf of a patient 
26 
provides, though, that a third party applicant is required to present an application in the same form 
and manner as an applicant. LC.§ 31-3504. This would include all necessary signatures. As the 
district court noted, page one of the application includes an acknowledgement that the information 
in the form would be used to determine eligibility for medical indigency assistance and that the 
individual has read and will comply with IDHW and the particular medical indigency program 
rules. (R. at 60, referring to T.O.R. at 3 and T.A.R. at 3). A completed application must contain 
a signature and acknowledgment on page one, and the applications submitted by Saint Alphonsus 
failed to include the appropriate signature. 
Saint Alphonsus further admits that neither application contained an executed Release of 
Information on page ten of the application. (Appellant's Brief, p. 15). The provider argues that it 
was not required to execute the release, as the form developed by IDHW only included space for 
a patient, applicant, or co-applicant to sign. (Appellant's Brief, p. 16, referring to T.O.R. at 13 and 
T.A.R. at 12). Moreover, Saint Alphonsus asserts, the legislature could not have intended a third 
party applicant be required to present an executed release as such a release would have no legal 
effect. (Appellant's Brief, p. 16). This argument is contrary to the plain meaning of "completed 
application" which requires the application contain "releases." LC. § 31-3502(7). Though Saint 
Alphonsus argues the term is not defined within the statute, this term is both easily understood and 
consistent with the provision deeming a completed application to be consent for providers, 
counties, and other interested parties to share the patient's personal information for the purpose of 
pursuant to section 31-3504, Idaho Code, shall, if possible, deliver a copy of the application to the patient within three 
(3) business days after filing the application." 
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determining eligibility. LC. § 31-3504(1 ). IDHW clearly recognized the plain meaning of the 
term "releases" and provided an appropriate "Release of Information" in the application. (T.O.R. 
at 13; T.A.R. at 12). Undeniably, this release of information was not executed as required by 
statute. 
Page nine of the application is entitled "Patient Rights and Responsibilities for State and 
County Assistance." (T.O.R. at 12; T.A.R. at 11). This document was signed by an authorized 
representative of Saint Alphonsus on both applications, but no initials appeared on the enumerated 
rights and responsibilities. (T.O.R. at 12; T.A.R. at 11 ). The district court drew particular attention 
to Saint Alphonsus' failure to fully execute this document. (R. at 60). The top of the document 
reads, "[t]he Applicant must read, or have read to them, and initial each of the following statements 
acknowledging they understand and accept these rights and responsibilities." (T.O.R. at 12; 
T.A.R. at 11) ( emphasis added). Some of the rights and responsibilities the applicant agrees to 
accept involve automatic liens on the patient's property, the duty to cooperate with the 
investigation, the obligation to reimburse the County, and the right to seek judicial review of a 
county's decision. Id. Saint Alphonsus argues that it does not have the authority to execute this 
document as it is entitled "Patient's Rights and Responsibilities," and therefore completion of this 
form cannot be required to present a "completed application." Again, this argument is contrary to 
the clear language of LC. § 31-3 502(7), which requires a completed application to include "patient 
rights and responsibilities." IDHW provides an appropriate form for this within the application, 
and a manner in which a third party applicant can easily provide a fully executed patient rights and 
responsibilities form: by reading the form to the applicant, or his authorized representative if the 
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patient is incapacitated, and indicate with the provider's initials whether the patient understands 
each provision. This would perhaps satisfy the County that the applicant had at least been notified, 
or someone had attempted to notify him, of his rights and responsibilities. Such assurance is 
especially important given that the penalty for a patient's failure to cooperate with an investigation 
is ineligibility for nonemergency assistance for two years. LC. § 31-3511. Saint Alphonsus did 
not execute the patient's rights and responsibilities section as required by statute, and this is clearly 
a prerequisite to a completed application under LC. § 31-3502(7). 
The district court further noted that page nine of the application provides for a sworn 
statement to the truth of the matters contained in the application as required by LC.§ 31-3504. 
The last uninitialed portion of the form states: 
"If I give false or misleading information to a hospital, County, to its agent, or to 
any person in order to receive county assistance, or fail to disclose resources or 
benefits available to me as payment or reimbursement, I will be guilty of a 
misdemeanor and punishable under the law." 
(T.O.R. at 12; T.A.R. at 11 ). The district court noted this statement would constitute an appropriate 
sworn statement to the truth of the matters contained in the application. Without an 
acknowledgment of this statement, the application cannot be complete. LC. § 31-3504. Saint 
Alphonsus argues the district court's finding with regard to this statement was erroneous, as the 
Board did not make a factual determination regarding the sworn statement. (Appellant's Brief, p. 
16). On the contrary, the Board noted the applicant or third party applicant's failure to properly 
execute page nine of the application, which included the sworn statement recognized by the district 
court. (T.O.R. at 172, 1 13; T.A.R. at 117, ,r 12). In its conclusions of law, the Board also 
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recognized that the truth of the matters contained in a completed application shall be sworn to by 
an applicant or third party applicant, and incorporated this requirement into its determination that 
the applications presented by Saint Alphonsus were not complete. (T.O.R. at 174, ,i 8; T.A.R. at 
119, ,i 8). Even if the Board failed to explicitly articulate a factual finding regarding the sworn 
statement, this Court should not negate the Board's implicit finding of the same and clearly related 
legal conclusion. Saint Alphonsus undeniably failed to properly execute the patient's rights and 
responsibilities document, which includes a sworn statement affirming the veracity of the facts 
contained in the application. This failure to execute the patient's rights and responsibilities form 
directly violates the plain language of LC. § 31-3502(7), and renders the application incomplete. 
2. The applications submitted by Saint Alphonsus lacked sufficient "personal 
information of the applicant," and were therefore incomplete. 
The district court held Saint Alphonsus provided sufficient personal information to support 
completed applications, and found the Board's determination to the contrary was not supported by 
substantial evidence. (R. at 59). While serious consideration should be given to the district court's 
decision, this Court reviews the agency's decision independently of the district court's findings, 
as if the agency's decision had been appealed directly to the Court. Mercy Medical Center, 146 
Idaho at 229, 192 P.3d at 1053; In re Ackerman, 127 Idaho at 497,903 P.2d at 86; Univ. of Utah 
Hosp., 128 Idaho at 519, 915 P.2d at 1377. The County again submits the Board properly found 
that the applications contained insufficient "personal information" as required for a "completed 
application." 
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As previously discussed, the language of LC. § 31-3502(7), when read in conjunction with 
the general purpose of the Act to ascertain the eligibility of applicants for the county's medically 
indigent program, offers clear guidance regarding the "personal information of the applicant" 
required for a completed application. This would necessarily include information to assist the 
county in establishing the applicant's residency and indigency, as well as the medical necessity of 
the services provided. This information would also include any personal information that would 
allow the county to investigate the application more expeditiously, given the duty of the applicant 
or third party applicant to cooperate, and the requirement that the clerk complete the investigation 
of an application for emergency medical services within forty-five ( 45) days. LC. § 31-3505A(2) 
and (4). 
Here, neither application contained contact information for the patient, beyond the 
purported current address. The spaces for telephone numbers and email addresses were left blank. 
(T.O.R., at 5; T.A.R. at 4). This contact information would have greatly assisted the County clerk 
in performing her statutory duties. Additionally, the T.O. application was incomplete as it failed 
to include any financial information supporting T.O.'s medical indigency. Though many of the 
application blanks contained answers, the third party applicant merely recited "no," "unknown," 
and "n/a" in response to prompts regarding the patient's income, expenses, and other resources. 
(T.O.R. at 8-11). Providers are certainly not required to have perfect knowledge regarding a 
patient's financial or residency situation, and are indeed only obligated to cooperate with the 
county "to the extent they have knowledge." LC.§ 31-3505A(2). Despite this, the definition of 
"completed application" certainly contemplates minimal research by the provider into the 
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applicant's "personal information" to assist in the county's investigation. Saint Alphonsus here 
did not meet that minimal requirement, as it failed to include essential personal information in 
either application. 
Saint Alphonsus argues offhandedly that the County should be barred from asserting the 
applications at issue here were incomplete because the applications were submitted on forms 
developed by IDHW and IDHW did not reject the applications for incompleteness. (T.O.R. at 14-
15; T.A.R. 13-14).19 The provider raises this issue for the first time in this appeal and provides no 
authority to support its position that the County is bound by IDHW' s determination of application 
completeness. When an Appellant asserts a position without support of authority or argument, that 
position is waived. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). 
C. Even if this Court finds the language of I.C. § 31-3502(7) ambiguous, it should 
give effect to the clear legislative intent of the amendment to this statute and 
affirm the Board's decision. 
When construing an unclear statute, a court must give effect to the legislative intent. St. 
Luke's, 146 Idaho at 755,203 P.3d at 685. In doing so, a court may consider the reasonableness 
of proposed interpretations, the policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. Id. The 
County extensively argued the clear legislative intent of the amendment to the language I.C. § 31-
3502(7), and the inclusion of the "completed application" requirement throughout the Act in other 
sections of this brief. The County additionally asserted the congruence between the 2011 
19 T.O.'s IDHW application was denied due to ineligibility for Medicaid, and T.A.'s IDHW application was denied 
because her income exceeded the maximum limit. 
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amendments and the overarching policy of this Act, and will only briefly touch on these issues 
here. Saint Alphonsus correctly asserts the general policy of the Act: to provide services to 
medically indigent individuals, and to compensate providers who supply those services to an 
obligated county's indigent residents. LC.§ 31-3501(1). This Court has recognized this two-
prong policy in a line of cases, as well as the right of third party applicants to enforce their right to 
compensation. See St. Luke's, 146 Idaho 753,203 P.3d 683; Saint Alphonsus, 146 Idaho at 863, 
204 P.3d at 503; University o/Utah Hospital, 143 Idaho at 810-12, 153 P.3d at 1156-58. 
However, Saint Alphonsus neglects to consider the legislature's declaration that the county 
medically indigent program is supposed to be a "payer oflast resort." In keeping with that intent, 
the legislature has determined some burden must be borne by applicants and third party applicants. 
LC. § 31-3501(2). When the legislature amended the Act in 2011 to include the "completed 
application" requirement, it adopted a Statement of Purpose clearly indicating its intent to create 
new definitions of completed application, specify that a completed application must be signed, and 
emphasize that a completed application must comply with the process and timelines established 
by the Act. See 2011 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 291, pp. 793 (RS 206080, HB 310, 2013). This 
statement of purpose clearly indicates the legislature intended to create new definitions of a 
completed application, and desired to incorporate this requirement into the already existing 
statutory framework. As the framework prior to 2011 already required that an application be 
completed before a county board would have jurisdiction to hear and approve it, the legislature 
clearly intended, by amending the definition of "completed application," to place a slightly greater 
burden on applicants and third party applicants to conduct some investigation and provide minimal 
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information to counties. This Court cannot ignore the legislature's clear determination to add a 
"completed application" requirement simply because it disagrees with the wisdom, justice, policy, 
or expediency of the statute." Verska, 151 Idaho at 895, 265 P.3d at 508. Even if this Court 
determines the statute's language is ambiguous, the legislative intent is certainly not. The Court 
must give effect to that intent. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reason, Respondent-Appellee respectfully requests that the Board's 
decision denying the medical indigency applications and the District Court's decision upholding 
the denials be AFFIRMED. 
n·-1'1n 
DATED this_--_-l_day of October, 2014. 
KRISTINA SCHINDELE 
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
BY:~~). }2 
JessicallK.uehn, Elmore County Deputy Prosecutor 
Attorneys for Respondents-Appellees 
34 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this __ day of October 2014, I caused two true and 
correct copies of the foregoing APPELLEE'S BRIEF to be served by the method indicated 
below, and addressed to the following: 
Robert A. Berry 
Elam & Burke, P.A. 
251 E. Front St., Ste. 300 
PO Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Michael J. Kane 
Michael Kane & Associates, PLLC 
PO Box 2865 
Boise, ID 83701 
Facsimile: (208) 342-2323 
Attorney for IAC 
Michael R. Chapman 
Chapman Law Office, PLLC 
PO Box 1600 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816 
Facsimile: (208) 667-7625 
Attorney for Kootenai Health 
Previously served via U.S. Mail 
on the 7th day of October, 2014 
Previously served via U.S. Mail 
on the 7th day of October, 2014 
Previously served via U.S. Mail 
on the 7th day of October, 2014 
9i),, ') . J-z--· 
J escaL. Kuehn ' 
Elmore County Deputy Prosecutor 
35 
